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Calling the U.N.'s bluff on Iraqi policy For months, like poker players trying to win a hand while holding nothing, the chattering classes of professional Bush critics had been calling for the President to go to the UN to get approval for a strike on Iraq, thinking either that he never would or that he'd fail to be convincing if he did. Bush called their bluff, and was holding aces. The success came partly in the simple outline of grievances
against Saddam Hussein, coupled with the list of UN resolutions dating
back to the Gulf War cease-fire that called for corrective measures on
pain of military action. By making such a clear case, the President put the onus on the United Nations and our faint-hearted allies to make a choice. That choice is between supporting a U.S.-led attack with strong UN backing, or a unilateralist U.S. attack coupled with the permanent irrelevance of the UN because it was too timid to enforce its own resolutions. Admittedly, this is an important long-term decision for the UN, as it will dictate its influence for the foreseeable future. Will it be an institution that recognizes injustice, that requires changes to be made in regimes like Iraq, and then does nothing? Or will it be a true force for good, and act with military might when it is necessary? Those that criticize U.S. hegemony should be praying the UN makes the right choice, because a strong, internationally active and respected UN could be a significant counterweight to the status of the U.S. as the world's only superpower. Should people recognize this it would be, of course, ironic that it took our cowboy President to make them see it. I have leapt to the conclusion that a military strike will be necessary, although there is new talk of UN weapons inspectors, which could conceivably preclude the need to bomb and occupy the country. There are many drawbacks to weapons inspections, and one could make a very solid case for removing Hussein and then sending in inspectors rather than the other way around. But sending inspectors in first may need to be part of the game we play with Iraq, and if the UN is willing to back its words with deeds, it can also solidify the case against Hussein. Since Bush's speech, Iraq has promised "unfettered access" for weapons inspectors. This will surely turn into another circus of obfuscation and obstruction intended to frustrate and confuse inspectors and those who are eager to find a reason not to attack. Hussein has spent much of the last decade making his weapon labs mobile and has become quite adept at hiding his deadly toys. We must be prepared to be patient when we need to be, and impatient when Hussein delays and denies access. Keep in mind, rather than voluntarily prove that he has disarmed his country, which would result in an end to the decade of sanctions that have cost him between $150 and $200 billion in oil revenue, he has continued to refuse inspections. This means Hussein has something he wishes to keep hidden and values at no less than $150 to $200 billion. When Hussein inevitably decides to prevent entry to a building, to delay inspectors for hours (he delayed them for days in the past), to threaten them, to limit their searches-that is the moment the UN will have to make the big choice. And they should make it quickly because U.S. cruise missiles and F-11's will be on the way. If the U.S. acts without the UN, it will prove that the only leadership in the world worth consideration is the U.S. leadership. The catch-22, however, is that if the UN now acts after the U.S. prodded it to, it may appear that the UN is merely the U.S.'s puppet. This is correct to a degree. President Bush essentially (sticking to the often used cowboy theme) grabbed the bull by the ring in its nose and dragged it where he wanted it to go. But he may well have saved the UN in doing so. The UN holds no significant influence over U.S. policy,
but the U.S. certainly holds some over the UN. This is largely the fault
of past UN inaction in the Balkans and elsewhere, and can only be corrected
in the long term by providing some military leadership and initiative
of its own. |
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