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Volume CXXXII, Number 4 |
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Call to arms
J.P. BOX
COLUMNIST
I love it when an NFL quarterback drops back in the pocket, surveys the scene, eludes the pass rush, unleashes a bullet into tight coverage, and gets intercepted by a defensive back. If he does it more than once, it makes him all the more endearing.
The National Football League keeps vital statistics to gauge a QB's play-completions, total yards, yards per attempt and per completion, as well as the mystical quarterback rating. However, Commish Paul Tagliabue and his staff of certified math dorks have failed to provide the public with a meaningful interception statistic.
The current statistics lie! The interception is not always a bad play or a lapse in judgment. A pick can be a game-turning, career-defining trademark of a winning NFL quarterback. What I refer to is the interception while being aggressive (IWBA unofficially).
Simply put, there are two types of interceptions-the IWBA and the afraid interception (AI - no relationship to artificial intelligence or Allen Iverson). Parenthetically, this is the first time in the history of sports reporting that interceptions, aliens, and Iverson have been mentioned within a single paragraph.
I hate the AI-a quarterback drops back, checks option one and two, feels the pocket collapse, fears the imminent pass rush, and chucks an errant ball into tight coverage. Most quarterbacks' stat lines are filled with AIs, a stat that reflects the ultimate failure of an NFL quarterback - the reluctance to sacrifice for the team.
Jeff George played for five different teams in his 11 year NFL career due to his high number of AIs. Of his 99 career picks, I would bet that a majority were AIs. George put enough zip on the ball to make scouts and coaches drool, but he simply tossed up too many early Christmas presents to play in January.
A second quarterback type is he with the high IWBA. Examples include Brett Favre, Peyton Manning, Drew Bledsoe, and Steve McNair. When one of these guys throws an interception, it is not always reflective of a poor decision-making.
Rather, it proves that they are willing to win the game. They play with an aggressive fire that guides their actions on the field. However, with aggressiveness comes the chance of failure, something that these quarterbacks must deal with constantly.
In the NFC Divisional Playoff game against the Rams in 2001, Brett Favre tossed five interceptions, or rather IWBAs, and thus rightfully became the goat of the Packers' playoff bust. However, Brett Favre is also the only three-time NFL MVP in the history of the game.
His willingness to lose the game is the reason why he continues to be the heart and leader of a winning Packers organization.
Like Favre, Manning was also publicly criticized last year by his head coach for tossing 23 interceptions. Many analysts and coaches pegged Manning with the responsibility of a losing season. If the Colts are to improve upon last season's fiasco, Manning will have to find ways to win games, not lose games due to his aggressive tendencies.
Due to the increasingly volatile nature of the NFL, many coaches and general managers have begun to shy away from the signal-callers with high IWBA rates. With job security increasingly shaky, management distrusts the quarterback who is willing to both win and lose a game.
For example, after the Colt's disappointing season, head coach Jim Mora was given the boot due to his inability to field a solid defense but also because of the sub-par play of Manning.
In a similar situation, John Elway effectively fired head coach Dan Reeves in 1996 by going public with his resentment toward the run-oriented offense of the Denver Broncos. To appease the gunslinger, owner Pat Bowlen brought in offensive guru Mike Shanahan.
In these two cases, the quarterback becomes larger than the coach. The playbook and the other ten guys who line up on offense are subordinate to the man behind the center. The team wins games it shouldn't, but also sometimes loses games that it should've won.
For these reasons, head coaches have opted for safer bets-like the Raiders' Rich Gannon and the Patriot's Tom Brady. These quarterbacks don't throw many AIs, but they also don't throw many IWBAs either.
Smartly, they play within the system and rarely improvise outside the game plan. Thus, the coach's job is to carefully craft a game plan that incorporates all eleven players-none of which truly stand out.
These guys will win when the game plan works, but will lose when the opposition presents a superior game plan or when talent is superior. If asked to mount a comeback against a superior team, they will flounder. And the coaches know it.
When a QB with a high IWBA total is asked to beat a superior team, his natural instincts tell him to be aggressive and fearless. He might lose the game, but he also might allow the underdog to steal a victory.
Suddenly a low interception total is not the telltale stat of a good quarterback. The best in the business often throw the most.